III.- Fuera de la vida nacional los que ultrajan a nuestros grandes hombres...
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Muchos años lleva Bonaparte Gautreaux Piñeyro ultrajando a Juan Bosch, el político que no dejó matar ni robar" (Ana Mitila Lora); "el moralista problemático" (Andrés L. Mateo); "el incorruptible y exigente, franco hasta la ultranza" (Claude Couffon); el dueño de una "personalidad mítica que encarna un ideal de probidad, de justicia y de civismo" (Ignacio Ramonet)... el poseedor de una "conducta patriótica, cívica, honesta, valiente y militante, como gobernante y líder, [que, NH] lo convierte en un símbolo de la dignidad nacional y en un ejemplo a seguir para las generaciones presentes y futuras de la República Dominicana" (Euclides Gutiérrez Félix: el más elevado portador de sus valores, en tiempo pasado, y hoy figura insignia de la vileza propia de los frágiles).
Ultrajó a Delio Gómez Ochoa —a quien casi se tragó crudo en un programa televisivo conducido por Freddy Beras-Goico—, y, ahora, aunque el propósito real era continuar su escalada de iniquidad contra Juan Bosch, cometió el espinoso error de agraviar al coronel Rafael Tomás Fernández Domínguez, "el dominicano que más me había impresionado después de mi vuelta al país. Me impresionó su integridad, su firmeza, que se veía a simple vista como si aquel joven militar llevara por dentro un manantial de luz" (Juan Bosch); el soldado que, mientras vigilaba, expresara al coronel Ludovino Fernández, su padre, cuando pretendía abrazarle, "respetuosamente señor, las reglas me impiden dirigirle la palabra"; el teniente que definió a los expedicionarios de junio de 1959 como "hombres de un valor que raya en la temeridad y nos avergüenza su arrojo y su pericia en todas sus acciones"; el guardia que preguntaría a un compañero de armas, en plena época de la dictadura trujillista, "¿Vas a ver esa mierda?, aludiendo la ejecución de los apresados; el capitán que en 1960, cuando un soldado norteamericano orinaba frente a los restos de los Padres de la Patria, detenía su vehículo y hacía presos al responsable de tan perversa acción y a sus acompañantes.
Fernández Domínguez fue, además, el militar que el 18 de enero de 1962 apresara a Pedro Rafael Rodríguez Echavarría, secretario de las Fuerzas Armadas, por haber instalado una junta Cívico-Militar y mantener en cautiverio a tres miembros del Consejo de Estado; el teniente coronel que, al encontrar en su casa "arroz, habichuelas, azúcar, aceite y otros alimentos", llevados por el encargado del comedor de los cadetes, reaccionara "con la ira natural de los hombres honestos cuando se encuentran ante tan indecorosas acciones [NH]" y sancionara al deformado militar "con diez días de arresto"; el mismo coronel que por vía de la esposa del ministro Silvestre Alba de Moya le enviaba a decir al presidente Bosch, las primeras horas de la mañana del 25 de septiembre, "estamos listos para asaltar el Palacio Nacional. Somos doce oficiales nada más, pero cumpliremos con nuestro deber. Pedimos, sin embargo, que se le informe al Partido Revolucionario Dominicano a fin de que desate una huelga general"... pero ya el presidente estaba preso; el arquitecto de la más grandiosa gesta de todo el siglo XX... "el Soldado del Pueblo y Militar de la Libertad".
Nuestros próceres merecen respeto; si no se frenan las calumnias, Duarte, Sánchez, Mella y Luperón serán los próximos.
No queremos concluir sin antes expresar a doña Arlette Fernández, viuda del único militar "libre de imperfecciones morales que ha existido dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas Dominicanas, defensor fiel de la institucionalidad", nuestra más sentida y militante solidaridad; sin antes decirle, a tan "extraordinaria escritora; esposa y madre ejemplar; amiga fiel y comprometida; valiosa y solidaria mujer dominicana de atributos morales, entrega y sacrificio que hacen de ella paradigma nacional", que ninguna falsedad podrá disminuir la talla del hombre al que amó entrañablemente y a quien la historia convertiría en héroe, mártir, prócer y padre de la patria. [Citas mías, NH].
Lo que sigue es una transcripción parcial de un documento extraído de la biblioteca Lyndon B. Johnson, en Texas, que desmonta la mentira con la que el periodista Gautreaux Piñeyro ha pretendido deshonrar a un prócer de la patria... Si le queda algo del espíritu revolucionario que antes le caracterizara, debería husmear el audio (este y los demás del archivo) que le permitirá constatar la veracidad de lo que publicamos -y publicaremos luego, en otro trabajo-, que hace -y hará- de su mendacidad algo ridículo.
Fin...
Archive
Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXXII
Released by the Office of the Historian
Dominican Republic
67. Memorandum for the Record [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Chron as DDCI and DCI, January 1–December 31, 1965, Folder 13. Secret. Drafted by Helms on May 14. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)]
Washington, May 13, 1965, 5:10–6:40 p.m.
SUBJECT: Meeting in the Cabinet Room 1700, 13 May 1965 on the Dominican Republic
PRESENT WERE: The President; For State: Messrs. Ball, Mann, and Kennedy Crockett; For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance; For the White House: Messrs. Bundy and Moyers; For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms
The remainder of the meeting was absorbed by two conversations with Mr. C.J. Davidson in San Juan, the first conducted by the President (4), and the second by Mr. Bundy. (5) From these conversations, it emerged that Bosch was sending a Colonel Hernandez at 6:00 A.M., 14 May, by plane to Santo Domingo for the purpose of having a conversation with Colonel Caamano, hopefully leading to his accepting Bosch’s solution to the political problem. The President was clearly doubtful that Colonel Caamano would agree to quit. Nevertheless, if Colonel Caamano does agree, then Bosch would talk with Guzman in an effort to persuade him to assume the presidency, after proper support from the Dominican Congress. This would be followed by an approach to Guzman from Mr. Bundy who would also undertake to insure that the five-man OAS committee would approve this approach. It was also decided to give Ambassador Bennett some small insight into the purpose of Colonel Hernandez’ trip. (6) It was left to the Department of Defense to arrange by what aircraft and with what arrangements Colonel Hernandez would proceed to Santo Domingo. (Nota: Colonel Hernández es el coronel Rafael Tomás Fernández Domínguez, NH).
(4) President Johnson placed a telephone call to Abe Fortas on May 13 at 5:35 p.m. During this 16-minute conversation Fortas outlined in great detail a plan, which is summarized here for the establishment of a coalition government in the Dominican Republic. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.24, Side A, PNO 1 and 2).
(5) McGeorge Bundy telephoned Abe Fortas on May 13 at 6:30 p.m. to finalize plans for the transportation of the two Dominican military officers from Puerto Rico to Santo Domingo, and discuss arrangements once they arrived. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.24, Side A, PNO 3)
(6) In telegram 1018 to Santo Domingo, May 13, Mann, without naming Fortas, informed Bennett and Palmer that an "intermediary" had arranged for two Dominican military officers in Bosch’s confidence, Colonels Hernandez and Herrera, to contact Caamaño once they arrived in Santo Domingo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)
Attachment No. 1 San Juan, May 13, 1965. Dictated by Mr. Davidson 4:15 PM—5/13/653. Juan Bosch will support for the Cabinet Julio Postigo. (Julio D. Postigo, a close personal friend of Juan Bosch, and a member of the Imbert government).It is understood that Juan Bosch will support the following objectives:
1. For President, Silvestre Antonio Guzman.
2. Juan Bosch proposes that he talk with Balaguer:A. To enlist his support for the plan and the new government, and
B. To inquire whether he would serve in the Cabinet or would suggest one of this associates for the Cabinet.
4. J.B. recognizes that the Cabinet might include a person— whether or not a military officer—who would have a special appeal to the San Isidro forces, and he will endeavor to suggest name or names.
5. J.B. is of the opinion that Colonel Coromines—not his brother, Lt. Col. Henrique Coromines—could be a satisfactory Chief of the Army. Bosch thinks that Coromines is now commander of the Mao fortress.
6. Communists. Last night’s paper sets forth the understanding. The detailed procedures will have to be worked out with the new President with the object of accomplishing an effective job utilizing the resources available to all concerned.
7. OAS and the President of the US would appear jointly as functioning to bring this about in cooperation with the Dominican people.
69. Memorandum for the Record (Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Chron as DDCI and DCI, Folder 13, January 1–December 31, 1965. Secret. Drafted by Helms on May 15. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)
Washington, May 14, 1965, 5:51–8:13 p.m.
SUBJECT: Meeting in the Cabinet Room, 1745, 14 May 1965 on the Dominican Republic
PRESENT WERE: The President ; For State: Messrs. Ball, Mann, and Vaughn ; For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance ; For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti; For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms
This meeting consisted of a two and a half hour discussion of a variety of matters affecting United States Government policy toward the Dominican Republic. At the start, Mr. Bundy indicated that he had heard from Mr. Davidson and that the approach to Caamano had gone a hundred percent. (2) In other words, Caamano had accepted the proposition conveyed to him by the two Colonels representing Bosch. Mr. Bundy also noted that the search was on to locate Guzman. At about 1930, another call came from Mr. Davidson to the President in which Mr. Davidson stated that Guzman had agreed to serve as president of a provisional government. (3) It was further indicated that Guzman was proceeding to San Juan for the purpose of meeting with Bosch. At this juncture, there ensued considerable discussion of which United States Government official should proceed to San Juan, to meet with Guzman, and to reenforce on the part of the United States how Guzman was to handle the problem of Communists in the Dominican Republic. The President finally decided, after considering McNamara and Harriman, to have Vance fly to San Isidro first for conversations with Ambassador Bennett and General Palmer, then proceed to San Juan, probably on 15 May, for the desired talk with Guzman...
(2) Fortas telephoned President Johnson at 2:45 p.m. on May 14 to inform him that "the entire plan has been accepted." They also discussed the next step in the plan, which was to locate Guzman. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.25, Side A, PNO 1 and 2)
(3) Fortas telephoned President Johnson at 7:29 p.m. on May 14 to tell him Guzman had agreed to accept the position. Fortas suggested that a "professional," such as Mc- George Bundy be sent to San Juan to meet with Guzman. President Johnson asked what Bundy would do, and furthermore, why was it necessary for him to go to San Juan since Fortas was as "good of a man as I’ve got" down there. Fortas thought it was essential for someone else to "talk to the future number one man, . . . to do a belly-to-belly understanding of everything." Fortas reasoned, "it would be better to have someone who will have a continuing role establish the relationship" since as an intermediary he would be leaving the scene eventually. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.25, Side A, PNO 4, and Side B, PNO 1)
83. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State (Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 3:20 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD for McNamara, and CIA for Raborn at 3:57 a.m.)
Santo Domingo, 20 de mayo de 1965, 0630Z.
Further block to early settlement—but not to a later solution— is reported death of Rafael Fernandez Dominguez/4/ in attack on Imbert held palace. This will shock Bosch deeply, though Guzman has taken it calmly. Utterly cynical rebel assertion that U.S. shot him in the back is seen for what it is by Guzman, but Caamano is on the air making as much emotional noise as possible. Unless Commies killed him in Spanish war style, Fernandez died soldier’s death he partly sought, and three U.S. Marines were wounded resisting rebel action about the same time. For a hot fire fight front and back are silly words. But rebels will be stirred, and Guzman will be rightly reenforced in his growing conviction that the men downtown are in no mood for reason.Further block to early settlement—but not to a later solution— is reported death of Rafael Fernandez Dominguez (4) in attack on Imbertheld palace. This will shock Bosch deeply, though Guzman has taken it calmly. Utterly cynical rebel assertion that U.S. shot him in the back is seen for what it is by Guzman, but Caamano is on the air making as much emotional noise as possible. Unless Commies killed him in Spanish war style, Fernandez died soldier’s death he partly sought, and three U.S. Marines were wounded resisting rebel action about the same time. For a hot fire fight front and back are silly words. But rebels will be stirred, and Guzman will be rightly reenforced in his growing conviction that the men downtown are in no mood for reason.
(4) Lieutenant Colonel in the Dominican Army with strong allegiances to Juan Bosch; a leader of the younger officers.
Ing. Nemen Hazim Bassa
San Juan, Puerto Rico
5 de mayo de 2017